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RECENT AMENDMENTS TO ILLINOIS CHILD
SUPPORT STATUTES: INCOME PERCENTAGE
GUIDELINES
Recent amendments' to Illinois' child support statutes2 have
raised many questions and problems for Illinois family court judges
and lawyers. The amendments were apparently intended to bring
Illinois into compliance with federal law, which requires all states to
establish guidelines for determining child support awards as a prerequisite to receiving federal contributions to Aid to Families With
Dependent Children programs.' Unfortunately, in its zeal to effectuate the desired compliance, the legislature has instituted changes
which are of doubtful constitutionality. The amendments invade
constitutionally-protected family choice areas, are unconstitutionally
vague, and result in unconstitutional classifications. Moreover, the
amendments present serious questions as to judicial application.
The legislature's rash action has created needless confusion in a previously well-settled area of Illinois law.
Prior to 1977, while Illinois statutes authorized child support in
divorce and separate maintenance proceedings, they did not provide
standards to assist a court in determining support amounts. Among
the factors courts considered were the child's needs,4 the parents'
available resources, 5 and parental needs and obligations.' The 1977
1. Act of Sept. 12, 1984, P.A., 83-1404, 1984 ILL. LEGIS. SERV. 188 (West).
2. The affected statutes were: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 10-2 and 10-5 (the Illinois Public Aid Code); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 504 (spousal maintenance provision of
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 505
(child support provision of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1106 (non-support provision of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution Act); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1224 (Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act); and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1359 (Paternity Act).
3. Act of Aug. 16, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1321 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 667).
4. See Plaster v. Plaster, 67 Ill. 93 (1873) (tender age and health must be considered); Flately v. Flately, 42 Ill. App. 3d 494, 356 N.E.2d 155 (1976) (child's financial resources and educational needs); Needler v. Needler, 131 Ill. App. 2d. 11, 268
N.E.2d 517 (1971) (child's health); Stumpfel v. Stumpfel, 285 Ill. App. 588, 2 N.E.2d
366 (1936) (age, health, mentality and sex of children).
5. See Everett v. Everett, 25 Il1. 2d 342, 185 N.E.2d 201 (1962) (available means
of parties); James v. James, 14 Ill. 2d 295, 152 N.E.2d 582 (1958) (valuation of husband's interest in corporation); Maupin v. Maupin, 403 Ill. 316, 86 N.E.2d 206 (1950)
(existing conditions).
6. Everett v. Everett, 25 Ill. 2d 342, 185 N.E.2d 201 (1962) (accommodating
needs of parties and children with resources of parties); Gray v. Gray, 39 Ill. App. 3d
675, 349 N.E.2d 926 (1976) (award of $100 per week excessive in light of father's $160
income); Popeil v. Popeil, 21 Ill. App. 3d 571, 315 N.E.2d 629 (1974) (husband's ad-
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Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act 7 (IMDAM) codified those considerations and added additional criteria with which to
determine child support amounts. The IMDMA originally mandated
that, in setting child support awards, a judge must consider all relevant factors,oincluding five specifically-enumerated considerations:
(1) the financial resources of the child; (2) the financial resources and
needs of the custodial parents; (3) the standard of living the child
would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (4) the
physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational
needs; and (5) the8 financial resources and needs of the noncustodial
parent or parents.
Recent amendments to Illinois' child support statutes add
mandatory guidelines to determine the amount of child support
based on net income percentages and the number of children to be
supported. The amendments offer a definition of net income and
state percentages of income to be awarded ranging from twenty percent for one child to a maximum of fifty percent for six children.,
The amendments also make health insurance coverage mandatory
and provide that debts owed to private creditors are to be disregarded in setting child support awards. 10 The amendments raise serious due process questions regarding whether the Illinois legislature
has interfered with parents' fundamental rights1" to rear and nurture children as they choose.
Over sixty years ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the familial relationship was encompassed within the liberties and privileges guaranteed all persons by the fourteenth
amendment. For example, the right of parents to educate their children in whatever manner they chose was held to constitute a fundamental right which deserved constitutional protection from state interference.1 2 The Court's examination of state intrusions into other
aspects of the family relationship has led to similar results. The
Court has determined that the state cannot: mandate that all chilmitted ability to pay).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 101.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 505 (1983).
9. Act of Sept. 13, 1984, P.A. 83-1404, 1984 ILL. LEGIS. SERV. 188, 194 (West).
10. Id. "In cases wherein health/hospitalization insurance coverage is not being
furnished to dependents to be covered by the support order, the court shall order
such coverage and shall reduce net income by the reasonable cost thereof in determining the minimum amount of support to be ordered." Id.
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See also Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1823).
12. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Pierce v. Society of Sister's 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring children to attend public schools held
unconstitutional as a deprivation of fundamental right of parents to rear and educate
their children as they wished); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 466 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidated
Amish parent's conviction for failure to abide by compulsory school attendance law).
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dren conceived must be born;' 3 forbid inter-racial marriage;' deprive a person of the right to procreate;1" forbid the use of contraceptives by married couples" or unmarried individuals;17 or
interfere with a family's living arrangements.' 8 The Court has declared that such decisions are constitutionally protected fundamental rights. The Court has also repeatedly held that any attempt to
interfere with the exercise of those rights will be strictly scrutinized.
Consequently, in order for a state to sustain legislation infringing
upon or abridging fundamental rights, it must show a compelling
interest.19

The imposition of mandatory health insurance coverage and
specific percentage support levels represent intrusions into a realm
of life which the state cannot enter without a showing of compelling
need. Whether or not to provide health insurance and what amount
of money a child requires are decisions that parents must be allowed
to make without state interference, as those decisions are decisions
of conscience much the same as educational choices. Because educational choices are recognized as fundamental, far more basic decisions as to life-sustaining support must also be considered fundamental. The Illinois legislature, while attempting to mitigate
marriage dissolution effects, has not shown a compelling need for its
action. While the state has an interest in insuring that children are
supported and provided necessary medical care, it has failed to show
that it has a compelling interest in demanding that some children be
supported at a certain level and be guaranteed medical coverage. It
has also failed to demonstrate that grave or immediate danger to the
state or to the child's health, welfare, or morals exists.2 0 It cannot be
denied that child support statutes are necessary because some parents fail to provide for their children. The idea that governmental
power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some
parents neglect their parental duties is, however, repugnant to amer13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidated Texas statute prohibiting
abortions other than for therapeutic purposes as violation of fundamental right of
privacy and autonomy to deal with one's own body).
14. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (held Virginia anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional as deprivation of fundamental right to marry).
15. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Oklahoma multiple criminal offender sterilization statute unconstitutional as deprivation of fundamental right to
beget children).
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute forbidding sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons unconstitutional).
18. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance limiting dwelling
occupancy to closely related individuals unconstitutional as invasion of fundamental
right of family choice).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (state interest must outweigh right infringed).
20. Id.
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ican tradition.2"
In addition to the serious substantive due process questions, the
amendments raise procedural due process questions because the legislation lacks coherent or sufficient standards for judicial application.22 The absence of such standards creates the danger that judges
will arbitrarily apply the law, imposing upon citizens their own personal values rather than those intended by the legislature.2 3 The
amendments create a myriad of ambiguities and fail to provide standards for judicial application. The legislature, in enacting child support guidelines, merely added the percentage guidelines to the existing statutory provisions which set forth specific criteria for
determining support. This creates ambiguity as to whether the court
should first consider the stated criteria of need, ability to pay, and
the financial resources of the child and the obligor parent, before
applying the guidelines or whether it should ignore the former factors and set support by following the guidelines alone. Similar ambiguity is raised by the statute's direction to use standard tax to arrive
at net income. No legislative definition of standard tax is provided.
Further, no direction is given as to whether net income is to be determined by scrutinizing both parties' incomes or whether only the
obligor spouse's income is to be considered. Blatant facial inconsistency is created since the statutes first mandate that a judge must
consider all relevant factors, which presumably includes personal
debt; they then direct a judge to disregard debt in determining the
child support amount. These statutes are unquestionably so indefinite, uncertain, and puzzling that persons of ordinary intelligence
must necessarily guess as to their meaning and differ as to their application; they therefore transcend procedural due process. 24
The amendments also raise equal protection questions. The
fourteenth amendment guarantees all persons equal protection of
the law. While states must necessarily draw distinctions between individuals, they cannot create disparate classes without sufficient reason. The Supreme Court has traditionally applied a two-tier system
to scrutinize equal protection questions: the rational basis test

5l

and

strict scrutiny. The Court has employed the rational basis test in
21. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (formal adversary hearing not required when parents seek to commit a child to a state mental institution because
some parents might abuse the right to commit children).
22. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
23. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 n.24(1979).
24. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (Boshuizen v. Thompson & Taylor Co., 360 Ill. 160, 195 N.E. 625 (1935) (striking down section of Occupational Diseases Act because statutory language was vague and
indefinite).
25. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (legislation must have a reasonable relationship to state's purpose). See generally Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1187-93 (1980).
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most areas. Where suspect classes26 or fundamental rights are involved, however, the strict scrutiny standard has been applied.27 The
fundamental rights branch of equal protection mandates that the
state may not deny a certain group access to fundamental rights28
nor can it unduly burden a particular group in the exercise of those
rights. 29 Thus, if fundamental rights are denied or burdened, the
state must articulate a compelling reason for its action.
The amended Illinois child support statutes now provide that
unwed parents, 30 divorced parents31 and parents who are not supporting their children, though married,32 must supply health insurance coverage and stated percentages of income for their children.
The percentage standards and mandatory health insurance provisions do not apply to parents who are married and providing support. The inequality resulting from the amended statutes cannot be
viewed as merely fortuitous. The states now mandate that certain
classes of parents provide health insurance coverage and pay a certain income percentage to support their children, while married parents are left free to decide whether to provide them with health insurance coverage and to choose the income percentage they wish to
expend on their children. Clearly, this is an arbitrary classification
denying certain parents their fundamental right of choice as to how
to provide for their children. Further, because the parents have exercised their fundamental right to bear children, they are being unduly burdened by these statutorily-created obligations. Finally, if
some children have a fundamental right to support from their parents, then all children must be treated equally. To mandate that
some children must be provided with a specified income percentage
and mandatory health insurance while denying other children the
same guarantees is an unreasonable and arbitrary classification
which should not pass scrutiny even under a rational basis test. If
the legislature's purpose was to place all children and all parents in
a similar position, then health insurance coverage and support levels
must be imposed on all parents. 33
26. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
27. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Wisconsin statute held unconstitutional following strict scrutiny analysis when it forbid persons having child support
arrearages to remarry).
28. Id. at 383.
29. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See generally, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1192
(1980).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1359 (Paternity Act) as amended by P.A. 83-1404.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 505, as amended by P.A. 83-1404 (child support in
dissolution of marriage cases).
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1107 as amended by P.A. 83-1404 (non-support).
33. The equal protection questions go far beyond those raised in Kujawinski v.
Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978), where the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled on the IMDMA's constitutionality. The court held that the IMDMA was not
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Yet another arbitrary classification has been created by the
specified income percentages. The state has articulated no reason,
much less a compelling reason, for dictating that one child requires
twenty percent of a parent's income while each of six children requires approximately eight percent. It appears that the legislature
merely arbitrarily and capriciously chose the figures without regard
to need or result. Because certain children are favored and certain
parents burdened by this legislation, the amendments are unconstitutional as violative of equal protection guarantees.
Of primary concern to Illinois family lawyers is the manner in
which judges will apply the amended statutes. Foremost among
their concerns is whether the factors formerly used to determine
support awards will continue to be considered. The paramount fear
is that judges will look only to the guidelines and arbitrarily determine support awards by considering only the non-custodial parent's
net income. Another great concern is the direction to disregard private debt, which is in direct conflict with precedent s' and with the
statute's mandate to consider all relevant factors. Because these
vague and indefinite amendments give judges little direction as to
application, it is not difficult to foresee that chaos will reign in Illinois family courts.
Another area of concern to lawyers is how judges will apply the
statute's direction to award support based on net income. It is a special concern for those clients whose earnings consist primarily of
commissions, or seasonal workers whose incomes fluctuate drastically. The spectre of yearly litigation looms over such parties as it is
unclear whether courts are to seasonally re-examine income or
whether a percentage rather than a given amount is to be ordered. It
would appear that an order containing a stated percentage might be
inappropriate in light of the fact that Illinois statutes mandate that
an amount be ordered.3 5 A final area of concern is that judges might
unconstitutional although it did, in practice, result in some inequality because it
could be construed to require divorced parents to contribute to a child's higher education. 71 Ill. 2d at 571, 376 N.E.2d at 1390. The Kujawinski court did not, however,
use the strict scrutiny standard of review required in cases involving fundamental
rights; rather, it used the "reasonable relationship" standard most often employed in
examining economic legislation.
34. In re Marriage of Block, 110 Ill. App. 3d 864, 441 N.E.2d 1283 (1982) (marital debts, as well as assets, must be equitably apportioned). See also In re Marriage
of Simmons, 101 Ill. App. 3d 645, 428 N.E.2d 1032 (1981) (where debts exceed assets,
equitable division must be made by court); Gan v. Gan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 265, 404
N.E.2d 306 (1980) (court considered all debts even though husband only ordered to
pay one); Petit v. Petit, 85 Ill. App. 3d 280, 406 N.E.2d 899 (1980) (abuse of discretion to award forty percent of husband's income to wife, where husband had debts).
35. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 28 Il1.App. 3d 320, 328 N.E.2d 600 (1975) (total financial condition of parties, including debt, must be considered in making child
support awards). The supreme courts of Georgia and Arizona have taken the position
that a percentage is not tantamount to an amount, and have remanded orders stating
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apply amended paragraph 504,6 which provides for Lester-type 7
support, a once popular combined spousal maintenance and child
support award virtually eliminated by the Federal Tax Reform Act
of 1984.38 It is conceded by most attorneys that barring further
I.R.S. clarification, such combined awards must be avoided to prevent adverse tax ramifications. If judges were to make such awards,
catastrophic consequences might result for some clients.
The Illinois legislature must immediately take action to remedy
the potential havoc created by its ill-advised and poorly drafted
amendments. Allowing this unconstitutional legislation a place
within a well-drafted statute which is designed to mitigate the effects of a dissolution of marriage, only serves to exacerbate a situation that most parties already consider traumatic. The amendments
must be repealed.
Barring repeal, the amendments should be made merely advisory. If advisory, Illinois child support determination could return to
the careful consideration it was afforded prior to the guideline enactment. Judges would then, once again, be allowed to consider all
relevant factors, rather than merely given the opportunity to look at
a chart.39 As one judge remarked about these amendments, "If the
legislature wants mathematical precision, it should just install computers in the courtroom. ' 4 0 Pending repeal or amendment, Illinois
only a percentage. See Newsome v. Newsome, 237 Ga. 221 (1976) and Brevick v.
Brevick, 129 Ariz. 51 (1981).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 504(b) (1983).
37. Lester-type support is an unallocated sum paid for combined maintenance
and child support. It is fully deductible to the husband and taxable to the wife. The
advantages created by such an arrangement traditionally encouraged larger awards
because the husband's ordinarily higher income was benefited by the deduction.
Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
38. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, - Stat. 793. Under the Tax Reform Act, if payments that would otherwise qualify as alimony or separate maintenance payments are to be reduced upon the happening of a contingency, such as the
child attaining a specified age, or the child's death, marriage or leaving school, the
amount of reduction will be treated as child support. It will then be non-deductible to
the payor and non-taxable to the payee. Similarly, if any payment will be reduced at
a time which can clearly be associated with such a contingency, even though not specifically stated, the amount of reduction will receive similar treatment. Temp. Regs.
Dom. Rel. Tax Ref. Act, 1984 I.F.L.R. 242.
39. Illinois courts have held use of guidelines an abuse of discretion in the past,
stating that the trial courts cannot ignore the statutory considerations of section 505.
In re Marriage of Brophy, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1112, 421 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (1981).
The Brophy court disapproved of the trial court's reliance on a normal or standard
rate of child support based on a percentage of the supporting parent's income. The
court noted that the use of a support chart violates the requirement to determine
child support by accommodating the needs of the children with the available means
of the parties. See also In re Marriage of Rundle, 107 I1. App. 3d 880, 438 N.E.2d 229
(1982) (substitution of predetermined schedule is trial court error).
40. Address by the Hon. Robert A. Cox, Presiding Judge, Domestic Relations
Division, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois, speaking at DuPage
County Bar Association Marital Law Seminar, Jan. 12, 1985.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:207

courts must re-examine the now-amended IMDMA's constitutionality, employing the strict scrutiny standard of review required when
fundamental rights are infringed.
ADDENDUM
Prior to publication, the Illinois Legislature passed legislation
which further amends the Illinois child support statutes. Senate Bill
41
91, currently awaiting Governor James Thompson's signature, ap-

pears to answer some of the questions raised. The bill deletes the
mandatory health insurance provision and provides that the court
may order health insurance only if the child can be added to an
existing policy at reasonable cost. The bill also provides for debt
consideration in certain circumstances, but only until such debt is
retired. The question of combined support and maintenance has
been alleviated entirely, as the bill removes the guidelines from paragraph 504.42 The percentage guidelines, however, remain intact in

paragraph 505.' 3 The bill provides that the court shall determine
child support by using the guidelines. It then states that the court
may deviate from the guidelines after considering all relevant factors, including the original IMDMA considerations."" Confusion
arises from the fact that the "supporting party's'

4

net income is to

be determinative of the amount. Who the "supporting party" is,
however, is not specified, but it appears that it may be both parents
because the original introductory language of paragraph 50546 states

that the court may order either or both parents to pay child support. While the legislature has taken corrective action in deleting
the mandatory insurance provision, it has not gone far enough. The
due process and equal protection questions remain unanswered.
Thea Meehan Armstrong

41.
29, 1985.
42.
43.
44.
45.
ch. 40, §
46.

Senate Bill 091, 84th General Assembly, 1985-86. Passed both houses July
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 40 § 504 (1985).
Id.
See supra note 8.
Senate Bill 091, 84th General Assembly, 1985-86 amending ILL. REV. STAT.
505 (1983).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40. § 505 (1985).

